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The gravity model is used to estimate the trade volume effects of the 
creation of the European currency union. The euro is estimated to have 
raised the level of aggregate trade between euro countries in 1998-2002 
compared to 1989-1997 by 15 per cent and the level of trade with outside 
countries by 8 per cent. The effect is clearly increasing over time. 
Estimates for one-digit SITC sectors yield a concentration of effects to 
highly processed manufactures, indicating that the spillover is caused by 
increasing vertical specialization across countries.  
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1. Introduction           
The question of whether the European currency union will create more trade between 
members and possible divert trade with non-members has attracted great interest in 
recent years among researchers and policymakers alike. Answers have been provided 
based on data for other currency unions and for countries at very different levels of 
development. We add to the small number of studies that have estimated the trade 
effects directly on data for the European currency unions and for countries with similar 
characteristics. We extend the previous studies by estimating effect on exports (one-
way trade) instead of bilateral (two-way) trade to separate the effects the effect on 
exports from euro to non-euro countries from the effect on exports to euro countries. 
Furthermore, we provide estimates not only for the aggregate but also for different 
sectors in order to see whether the effects are present in certain sectors and absent in 
other. The results support recent research findings of increasing international vertical 
specialization and provide an explanation for increased trade not only between euro 
countries but also with outside countries.  
The seminal paper by Rose (2000) on the currency union effect on trade volume 
did not forecast the effect of the European currency union but was motivated by it. 
Rose estimated a gravity model of trade on data for 186 countries and other entities for 
which trade statistics are collected. He found that a common currency increases 
bilateral trade by 235 percent on average, controlling for a host of factors, including 
country size, distance and other geographical factors, language, colonial history, and 
exchange rate volatility. His paper was immediately criticized on several grounds. First, 
critics argued that it was just more likely that extensive trade gave rise to currency 
unions than the other way around. Second, a common currency and extensive trade 
could be jointly caused by missing variables. Third, the observations of currency unions 
in Rose’ sample – one per cent of the total – were not a random selection of countries 
and their particular characteristics were not fully controlled for. Fourth, estimates based 
mostly on small and poor island states and former or present colonies could not be used 
for making inferences about the effects of the European currency union. Finally, Rose 
(2000) is a pooled cross-section study, answering the question: Do countries with a   3
common currency trade more? More relevant for the effects of the euro would be to use 
panel data to capture the time dimension and to answer the question: Does the switch to 
euro cause more trade? 
The first and second criticisms have been adressed by Tenreyro and Barro (2003) 
among others. They observe that many countries share currencies as a result of their 
decision to adopt the currency of an anchor country and not because of their mutual 
economic relations. The joint probability that two client countries independently adopt 
the currency of the same anchor country is used as an instrumental variable in the 
estimation of the currency union effect. They conclude that a large currency union 
effect exists and that it is not caused by endogeneity. The second and third criticisms 
have been dealt with by Persson (2001). He uses statistical techniques to find a control 
group of countries with characteristics closely matching those of the currency union 
countries, except for having a common currency. He also used non-parametric methods 
to allow for non-linearities. His estimates of the currency union effect were much lower 
than those of Rose and insignificant. However, when Rose (2001) applied Persson´s 
methods on a larger data set, including a greater number of observations of common 
currencies, he found significant effects of 21-43 per cent. Furthermore, when he re-
estimated the gravity equation on panel data for a longer time period and with a closely 
matched control group the common currency effect was a significant 685 per cent. A 
survey and discussion of the research on currency union effects, with references to 
other attempts at coming to grips with the problems of endogeneity, missing variables 
and sample characteristics can be found in Rose (2002).  
Two approaches have been followed in addressing the fourth criticism that 
estimates for other currency unions cannot be used to infer the effects of the European 
currency union. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) exploit the structural model developed 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The basic idea is that trade between any two 
countries is a function of the bilateral trade costs as well as the trade costs with all other 
trading partners. The greater bilateral trade relative to trade with other trading partners 
is initially, the smaller will be the increase in trade following the adoption of a common 
currency since trade costs already are relatively small. Using estimates from previously 
existing currency unions and taking account of the trade cost and trade pattern of the   4
euro countries, Rose and van Wincoop predict that the euro will increase trade between 
the euro countries by about 60 per cent.  
A second approach estimates effects directly on data for the European currency 
union. Obviously, this has become possible only recently, as sufficient time series data 
have accumulated since January 1, 1999, when the exchange rates of eleven EU 
countries were irreversibly fixed visavi each other. (Greece joined the currency union as 
the twelfth member on January 1, 2001.) This approach solves the problem of making 
predictions out of sample and escapes the other points of criticism to some extent. To 
date, three studies exist, by Bun and Klaassen (2002), by Barr, Breedon and Miles 
(2003) and by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003). Bun and Klaassen employ a model 
that is similar to the gravity model but assumes that real exchange rate and common 
currency effects are cumulative over time and consequently use dynamic panel 
estimation. They find that the short run effect is 4 and the long run effect 38 per cent. 
Barr et al estimate a standard gravity model on a panel consisting of 17 European 
countries and data from 1978 to the first quarter of 2002. The currency union effect is 
estimated at 29 per cent.  
The study by Micco et al is the most detailed of the three. They estimate a gravity 
equation on a panel of 22 OECD countries and yearly data for 1992-2002. The currency 
union effect is estimated with two alternative specifications. One specification uses a 
year dummy common to the euro countries for the whole period. The other 
specification uses a euro country dummy during the currency union years and restricts 
the coefficients to be identical across years. In the first specification, the euro effect on 
trade is estimated to be about 18 per cent in 1999 and about 28 per cent in 2002. In the 
second specification, the average effect per year is estimated at 13 per cent. Micco et al 
also investigate whether the introduction of the euro has diverted trade for euro 
countries from non-euro to other euro countries. They find the opposite; trade between 
euro and non-euro countries is estimated to have increased by an average of 8 per cent 
over the currency union period.   
Our study extends the study by Micco et al. First, we use unilateral trade – exports 
in one direction – and not bilateral trade – exports in both directions – as the dependent 
variable. This is motivated by the positive spillover effect on trade between euro and   5
non-euro countries found by Micco et al. We want to investigate whether exports from 
euro to non-euro countries have been affected differently than exports from non-euro to 
euro countries. Second, we estimate effects for nine one-digit SITC sectors in addition 
to the aggregate effects. Separating the spillover effects and estimating effects on the 
sector level may help us to uncover the underlying mechanisms behind the spillover 
effect, which has no immediate explanation. We use a panel with 20 OECD countries 
and yearly data for 1989-2002.  
 
2. Our specification of the gravity equation 
We estimate a gravity equation with a somewhat non-standard specification.
1 Our 
specification differs from the standard by having one-way trade (exports) instead of 
two-way trade (exports plus imports) as the dependent variable. In a two-country world 
economy this does not matter since bilateral trade is balanced so that exports plus 
imports equals twice exports. In a world economy consisting of three countries, 
bilateral trade could in principle be unidirectional: A exports only to B, which exports 
only to C, which exports only to A. Our specification gives two observations for each 
country pair instead of one with the standard specification. The two observations will in 
principle have explanatory variables with the same values but dependent variables with 
quite different values. Consequently, estimates will tend to be less precise than with the 
standard specification.  




We estimate the gravity equation using OLS with dummies for each country pair 
(not listed in the table). The country pair dummies capture all factors that are particular 
to the pair and constant over time. Variables such as distance, border contiguity and 
language similarity are therefore subsumed in the bilateral fixed effects.  
                                                 
1 For theoretical foundations of the gravity equation, see e.g. Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman 
(1985), Deardorff (1998) or Harrigan (2003). We note only that the gravity equation can be derived from 
the Ricardian model with a continuum of products, the Heckscher-Ohlin model with more goods than 
factors and unequal factor prices, or the monopolistic-competition-increasing-returns model of trade.   6
Having exports as the dependent variable, it becomes necessary to take account of 
changes in real exchange rates. This is less necessary with bilateral trade as the 
dependent variable, since changes in the bilateral real exchange rate will have offsetting 
effects in bilateral trade. We include both the bilateral real exchange rate and the 
average of third countries’ real exchange rate against the importing country; an 
appreciation of competitors’ real exchange rates will favor the exporting country.  
The EEA year dummies, common to all EU countries and Norway, control for 
decreasing trade costs connected to the Single Market. A dummy to control for the 
entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 is included for similar reasons. Effects of 
the Uruguay Round are captured by a dummy that takes on a value of unity for trade 
between European and non-European countries during the period 1995-2002.  
Six dummy variables have been included to control for the effects on measured 
trade of changes in the way trade statistics are collected. Cross-border trade within the 
EU-15 was in principle checked and recorded at the border before the launch of the 
Single Market in 1993 (1995 for Austria, Finland and Sweden). Subsequently, trade is 
recorded by self-reporting of firms and by collecting statistics from firm samples. 
However, imports by EU countries from non-EU countries are in many instances 
recorded as imports from the EU countries through which they were trans-shipped. This 
has led to a substantial recorded decrease in imports from non-European countries to 
inland and peripheral EU countries, and to a corresponding recorded increase in imports 
from non-European countries in countries to which the goods first arrive, in particular 
Belgium and the Netherlands, a phenomenon known as “the Rotterdam effect”. We 
attempt to control for this by the inclusion of dummy variables for the EU-12 starting in 
1993 and for Austria, Finland and Sweden starting in 1995 respectively.  
The variables of primary interest are the three dummy variables for exports 
between euro countries, exports from euro to non-euro countries and exports from non-
euro to euro countries respectively. We will estimate two alternative specifications, one 
in which euro dummy variables are set for the whole period and the coefficients are 
allowed to vary across years, and one in which they are set for the euro period and  
coefficients are restricted to be constant. The first specification identifies effects that 
are common to that category of exports relative to exports between non-euro countries   7
each year. The second specification is a difference in difference comparison; three 
categories of exports receive a “euro treatment” during the latter part of the period 
whereas the fourth category receives no treatment. Significant dummy coefficients can 
be attributed to the introduction of the euro.  
 
3. What do the raw data show? 
Before turning to the results, it is of interest to see if we can see indications of euro 
effects in the raw trade data. Our country sample consists of 20 industrialized countries 
which are broadly similar in terms of economic development. The ten euro countries 
are Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg (treated as one country in trade statistics), Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece, which 
entered the currency union in 2001, was not included in the sample because of its late 
entry and because it has been late in reporting industry trade data. The ten non-euro 
countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. We classify trade into four categories: 
(1) exports between euro countries, (2) exports from euro to non-euro countries, (3) 
exports from non-euro to euro countries, and (4) exports between non-euro countries.  
Figure 1, panel a) provides a description of the growth of trade of all four 
categories, while panel b) provides a description of the growth of trade of the first three 
categories relative to the fourth.     
 
Figure 1, panel a) and b) 
 
Panel a) shows that the trade of all four categories increase at approximaterly the 
same rate until the year 2000, when exports between non-euro countries and from non-
euro to euro countries start to decrease. Panel b) shows the same development in 
relative terms. The first three categories increased their trade relative to trade between 
non-euro countries somewhat in the 1990’s. Starting in 2000, exports between euro 
countries and exports from euro to non-euro countries take off.  
It is not at all clear that these developments can be explained by the introduction 
of the common currency in 1999. First, trade between euro countries decreases relative 
to trade between non-euro countries between 1999 and 2000. Second, it is exports from   8
euro to non-euro countries that show the highest increase absolutely and relatively, not 
exports between the euro countries. Any euro effects on trade have to be uncovered by 
estimating the partial effects of the various factors that are thought to determine the 
volume of trade.  
 
4. Euro effects on aggregate trade: when do they begin, what is the trend? 
The gravity equation is first estimated with a year dummy for each of the three 
categories of bilateral trade involving euro countries: exports between euro countries, 
exports from euro to non-euro countries and exports from non-euro to euro countries. 
The benchmark is exports between the three non-euro EU countries and between them 
and non-EU countries. Exports between non-EU countries are not included in the 
benchmark because of a lack of trade data on the industry level. The estimation will tell 
whether the levels of exports of the three categories involving euro countries differ 
significantly year by year from the level of exports between non-euro countries. We are 
in particular interested to see whether the levels of exports involving euro countries 
increase relative to the level of exports of non-euro countries with the introduction of 
the euro. Significantly higher coefficients after than before would indicate a euro effect 
on the volume of trade. The estimation will also tell us in what year the euro effect 
kicks in and if the effect is increasing over time.  
The results are shown in Table 2.  Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the 




The black staples in the figure show by how many per cent the level of exports 
between euro countries differ from the level of exports between non-euro countries. 
Similarly, the grey and white staples show by how many per cent exports from euro to 
non-euro countries and exports from non-euro to euro countries respectively differ. 
There is no clear pattern before 1997 and the point estimates are relatively small. 
Starting in 1997, all three coefficients become positive and show an increasing trend. 
The trend is strongest for exports between euro countries and weakest for exports from   9
non-euro to euro countries. Thus, Figure 2 strongly suggests that something is boosting 
trade involving euro countries starting in the latter part of the 1990’s. We need to test 
for significant differences in coefficient estimates between years to determine whether 
there is a break in the time series and whether there is a significant increasing trend in 
the coefficients. Table 3, panels a) – c), present the χ





Panel a) clearly shows that a break occurs in 1998 for exports between euro 
countries; the 1998 and 1999 coefficients are significantly greater than those for every 
previous year except 1994 and 1995. The increasing trend is also clear; the 1998 and 
1999 coefficients are significantly smaller than those of 2001 and 2002. Panel b), for 
exports from euro to non-euro countries, does not show a break in 1998, but the trend 
increase is visible although not as marked as in the case of exports between euro 
countries. Panel c), for exports from non-euro to euro countries, does not give evidence 
of a break in 1998 or of an increasing trend.   
It is clear from Figure 2 and Table 3 that something causes an increase in trade 
starting in 1998 between the euro countries and to a lesser extent in exports from the 
euro to the non-euro countries relative to trade between non-euro countries. (It also 
seems that the year dummies pick up a stronger business cycle in 1994 and 1995 in 
Europe than in other parts of the world.) We cannot find any other explanation for the 
break than the start of the currency union in 1999. Our conclusion is strengthened by 
the fact the the the effect is increasing over time. That the euro effect seems to start in 
1998 and not in 1999 is not as puzzling as it may seem. It became increasingly certain 
in the course of 1998 that the currency union would come into effect as planned on 
January 1, 1999. On March 25, the European Commission and the European Monetary 
Institute published their convergence reports, recommending that eleven countries join 
the currency union. The special meeting of the European Council in early May 
followed the recommendation and determined the exchange rates at which the national 
currencies were to be converted into the common currency. Thus, the worries that some   10
countries would not be able to meet the budget and debt criteria for membership were 
put to rest and the uncertainty surrounding the conversion rates was dissolved. 
Furthermore, it was possible to hedge against any exchange rate changes during the 
remainder of 1998. In other words, exchange rates could be fixed already eight months 
before the start of the currency union. It is therefore quite natural that euro effects on 
trade can be seen already in 1998. 
 
5. Euro effects on aggregate trade: how large are they? 
The estimates with year dummy coefficients tell us that the euro effects start in 1998 
rather than in 1999. When we next estimate the average euro effects for the euro period, 
we set the euro dummies for 1998-2002 and not 1999-2002. The estimates will tell 
whether the levels of exports involving euro countries differ from the levels during the 
pre-euro period and from the level of exports between non-euro countries. Table 4 




The euro effects on trade can be seen at the top of column (6). The estimated 
effect on exports between euro countries corresponds to 15 per cent, on exports from 
euro to non-euro countries to 8 per cent and on exports from non-euro to euro countries 
to 7.5 per cent. Thus, we find a subtantial spillover to trade between the eurozone and 
countries on the outside, as do Micco et al (2003). Contrary to our expectations, exports 
to the euro countries are increased to the same extent as exports from euro countries. 
We postpone a discussion of what factors could explain the spillover effect.  
It should be stressed that the euro effects shown in Table 4 are averages for the 
euro period relative to the average for 1989-1997 and relative to exports between non-
euro countries 1989-2002.
2  As seen in Figure 2 or Table 2, the effects are increasing 
over time and indicate that the long run effects could be much larger. The 
corresponding estimates for 2001-2002 are approximately 25, 15 and 9 per cent 
                                                 
22 Calculated as e
coefficient value – 1 = effect in per cent.    11
respectively (calculated by subtracting averages for 1989-1997 from averages for 2001-
2002).  
Have we really identified trade increases caused by the introduction of the euro? 
The relatively short time that has passed since its introduction is a source of 
uncertainty. It is possible that the estimates reflect missing variables, most of which are 
beyond our imagination. One possibility – which seems remote – is the outbreak of 
“europhoria”, an epidemic that should not be particularly long-lived. Another 
possibility is that the IT-bubble hit non-euro countries harder than euro countries, and 
that this has affected exports in a way that is not fully captured by changes in GDP. It is 
on the other hand reassuring that the effects seem to kick in precisely when they are 
expected to and moreover that they show a clear and steady increase over time.    
Practically all of the other estimates in Table 4 have the expected sign and are 
highly significant. We find that the elasticities of exports with respect to GDP of the 
exporting and importing country sum to 2.4, which is consistent with the observed trend 
increase in the ratio of trade to GDP in the postwar period.  
Furthermore, the elasticity of exports with respect to the real exchange rate is 
roughly unity, while the elasticy of exports with respect to competitors’ real exchange 
rate is lower; the difference indicates some degree of product differentiation. 
The (average) standard deviation of first differences of logs of monthly nominal 
exchange rates in our sample is 1.6 per cent (as compared to 7 per cent in Rose’ (2000) 
sample). Reducing the average exchange rate volatility by one standard deviation to 
zero is estimated to increase trade by 1.5 per cent.
3  This estimate is lower by a 
magnitude than the 13 per cent found by Rose (2000), but similar to the estimates 
obtained by Tenreyro (2003) in panel data.  
The entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU had no significant effect on 
their exports to other EU countries. This could be expected, since they were part of the 
Single Market, except for agricultural products, prior to their entry into the EU.  
                                                 
3 Calculated as e
[-0.940 x (-0.0158)]
 – 1 = 0.015, where 0.0158 is the average standard deviation of exchange 
rate variability in our sample.   12
Trade liberalization following the Uruguay Round is estimated to have increased 
trade between Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and United States 
on one side and the rest of the European countries on the other by about 11 per cent.  
Finally, we can see that the change in the way trade statistics are collected has had 
large and very significant effects on recorded trade in the expected directions. Exports 
from non-European countries to the EU-10 and the EU-3 decreased as recorded, and 
exports from Belgium and Netherlands to the rest of the EU increased. One estimate 
has the wrong sign, namely non-EU countries’ exports to Belgium and Netherlands 
after the launch of the Single Market in 1993; we expected a recorded increase but the 
sign is negative and significant.  
Not shown in Table 4 are the coefficient estimates for the EU year dummy. They 
are however very close the estimates of the EU year dummy in Table 2. The estimates 
in both tables are generally positive and highly significant. EU membership is estimated 
to raise the level of trade between EU countries by about 15 per cent. A higher level is 
expected, but contrary to expectation we do not find a rising trend reflecting the 
increasing integration due to the Single Market.  
  
5. Robustness checks  
We check the sensitivity of our results in Table 4 with respect to changes in the length 
of the pre-euro period, the exclusion of countries and country groups and the exclusion 
of explanatory variables.
4  
Table 5 shows the results of shortening the time period before the introduction of 




The estimates are stable in terms of sign and significance. The exception is the 
estimate of the effect of nominal exchange rate uncertainty, which is mostly 
insignificant. The estimates are also remarkably stable in terms of magnitude; subtantial 
                                                 
4 We have also tested for sensitivity to clustering of various types of observations for which error terms 
may not be independently distributed, which could affect the standard errors. The euro estimates remain 
significant at the 1 per cent level regardless of the way observations are clustered.    13
changes occur only when the pre-euro time period has been shortened to three or four 
years. 




Most estimates are very robust to the exclusion of individual countries or country 
groups. The main exception is the effect of nominal exchange rate volitility, which is 
quite sensitive to the exclusion of individual countries (as it was to shortening the pre-
euro period). We can also see that the euro effect for exports from euro to non-euro 
countries becomes insignificant when non-EU countries are excluded from the sample. 
This means that the euro did not boost exports from euro countries to the three euro 
outsiders in the EU, Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom, when the benchmark 
consists of exports between the outsiders. The effect is, on the other hand, significant 
and of the same order of magnitude as in the full country sample when non-European 
countries are excluded. The conclusion to be drawn is that the euro has boosted exports 
from the euro countries to the European non-EU countries in our sample,  Norway and 
Switzerland.  In the case of exports from non-euro to euro countries, no effect of 
excluding non-EU or non-European countries can be seen.  
Looking at changes in the magnitude of the euro effect on trade between euro 
countries, we can see that the exclusion of non-European and in particular non-EU 
countries reduces the effect. The benchmark when non-European countries are 
excluded becomes trade between the non-euro countries of the EU and between them  
and Norway and Switzerland. When non-EU countries are excluded the benchmark 
becomes trade between Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom. The reduced effects 
imply that trade between between these three countries is on a higher level than 
between them and non-EU and non-European countries, which is to be expected. In the 
case of excluding individual countries from the sample, the exclusion of Sweden 
matters most for the euro effect on trade between the euro countries. This implies that 
Sweden’s trade with other non-euro countries is relatively small. 




The estimated euro coefficients are sensitive in terms of magnitude to the 
exclusion of GDP and real exchange rates, but the high significance of the estimates 
remain. The year dummies, on the other hand, affect both the magnitude and 
significance of the result. Their inclusion is apparently quite important to separate 
effects common to the whole sample on the one hand and effects common to trade 
involving euro countries on the other.  
 
6. Euro effects on trade in different sectors 
We have estimated the gravity equation for nine different goods producing sectors in 
addition to the aggregate economy. Sector effects are interesting in their own right and 
they can help us to find explanations for the spillover effect on trade between euro and 
non-euro countries. 
We should not expect that the specification used for the aggregate level performs 
equally well on the sector level. First of all, trade on the sector level reflects 
comparative advantage to some extent. For example, Danish and Swedish exports and 
imports of pulp and paper reflect their respective scarcity and abundance of forest land; 
Denmark will have relatively small exports and large imports while the opposite is the 
case for Sweden. Second, shocks to individual sectors and even to individual firms will 
play a role. Two Swedish examples illustrate this. Swedish exports of pharmaceutical 
products increased very strongly during the 1990’s, much due to the success of the drug 
Losec produced by AstraZeneca. Generics have now taken a share of the market. The 
other example is the telecommunications company Ericsson. Ericsson products made 
up almost 15 per cent of Swedish exports in the year 2000. Following the crisis of the 
telecommunications industry, the share fell to only 5 per cent in 2002. Comparative 
advantage and shocks to individual sectors call for including sector output in both the 
exporting and importing country as explanatory variables. Failure to do so could bias 
the estimates since sector outputs and changes in sector outputs are likely to be 
correlated with GDP and changes in GDP.  Unfortunately, time series of real value   15
added for one-digit SITC sectors for the 20 countries involved are not readily available 
and we have therefore not included sector outputs as explanatory variables. Our 
estimates must be considered with this in mind. 




The sector estimates are much more irregular than the aggregate estimates as 
expected. Significant euro effects are concentrated to a few sectors: beverages and 
tobacco, chemical products, including pharmaceuticals, and products from 
manufacturing industries. In other words, we find that the euro effects are concentrated 
to goods that require relatively much processing and are differentiated (not standardized 
or homogeneous). Beverages and tobacco do not fit the first characteristic but are 
differentiated consumer goods. We will argue that the concentration of euro effects to 
these sectors is not random, but can be explained by a relatively high degree of vertical 
specialization across national borders, particularly in manufacturing, and by relatively 
high investments in marketing and distribution for differentiated products.  
The relation between vertical specialization and international trade has been 
studied by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and by Yi (2003) among others. Hummels et 
al estimate that the use of imported inputs in goods that are exported grew by almost 30 
per cent for ten OECD and four emerging market countries between 1970 and 1990 and 
that this accounted for 30 per cent of the growth in these countries’ exports. Yi provides 
an explanation for how the relatively small tariff reductions on manufactures in the 
postwar period can have caused large increases in trade. His extreme example captures 
the essence of the argument:  
A good is produced in N sequential stages, with each stage produced in a different 
country. The first stage involves value added only. All remaining stages involve 
infinitesimally small value added. Then, when tariffs fall by one percentage point, 
the cost of producing this good will fall by N percent, in contrast to a 1 percent 
decline in the cost of a ‘regular’ traded good. In addition, because of the tariff 
reductions, it may be efficient for goods that were previously produced entirely in   16
one country to now become vertically specialized. This will also lead to an 
increase in trade.  
Yi also provides an explanation for why the effects can be non-linear, i.e. for why 
successive, small reductions in tariffs eventually can cause large increases in trade: 
“Suppose that tariffs are initially sufficiently high that there is no vertical 
specialization. Now tariffs begin to fall. At first, they are still sufficiently high that 
vertical specialization does not occur. Nevertheless, trade still increases for standard 
reasons. As tariffs continue to fall, vertical specialization becomes more of a 
possibility. Eventually, a critical rate is reached at which vertical specialization starts to 
occur.”  
The effects described by Yi of tariff reductions apply, we argue, also to the 
reduction in trade costs provided by a common currency and can explain why a 
relatively small trade cost reduction can result in relatively large trade increases. It can 
also explain why euro effects can be seen in exports from as well as exports to euro 
countries. Replacing national currencies with a common currency reduces the cost of 
trade across national borders within the eurozone. The cost of goods that are produced 
in successive stages in different countries in the eurozone is therefore reduced by the 
introduction of the common currency. The size of the cost reduction is related to the 
degree of international vertical specialization. The introduction of the common 
currency also gives incentives for some firms to switch from national to international 
vertical specialization. Goods that benefit from these cost reductions become more 
competitive in markets outside the euro area as well. Consequently, exports from euro 
to non-euro countries increase. Some of the products that experience an expansion of 
production and trade as a result of the currency union use inputs imported from outside 
the eurozone. Producers of such inputs in non-euro countries may therefore find that 
they can export more to euro countries than before the creation of the currency union. 
(Some of them may of course not be so lucky; they will find that demand for their 
products is diverted to producers in the eurozone.) There is also an effect on the input 
side for producers in non-euro countries. Cheaper inputs imported from euro countries 
will make their products cheaper as well, and will in turn make possible more exports 
to the eurozone. Hence, it is no mystery that the introduction of a common currency can   17
create more trade with outside countries in both directions, in addition to more trade 
within the currency union itself. Increased vertical specialization across national 
boundaries can also explain the successive increase in the euro effects that we see in 
our results. We do not expect firms to change their sourcing patterns suddenly; such 
changes should take time to implement.   
We have noted another characteristic than a high degree of processing for the 
products that are most affected by the euro, namely that they are relatively 
differentiated. This is true for beer, cigarettes and cars for example. To introduce a new 
brand or a new line of cars in a national market requires a relatively large up-front 
investment in marketing and retail distribution. The return to the investment is spread 
over a period of many years and will depend on the nominal exchange rate, among 
other factors. Fixing the nominal exchange by the introduction of a common currency 
could increase investments that were previously thought to be too risky and 
consequently lead to increased trade. Thus, we argue that the relatively high marketing 
and distribution costs that have to be paid up-front when launching differentiated goods 
contribute to explain the positive effects on trade of a common currency.  
 
7. Trade effects for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom of joining the 
    currency union 
The trade effects for the three euro outsiders, Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, of joining the currency union can readily be calculated using the aggregate 
estimates in Table 2 or Table 4. The average trade effect over the first five years, 1998-
2002, for the euro countries is estimated at 15 per cent in Table 4, and the average 
effect on trade with outside countries is estimated at about 8 per cent. By joining, the 
three outsiders should expect that the level of their trade with the other euro countries 
becomes 15 – 8 = 7 per cent higher during the first five years of membership. Their 
trade with countries outside the currency union will also increase by about 8 per cent. 
Hence, total trade with countries in our sample would increase by 7-8 per cent. 
Providing that trade with other non-euro countries will increase by as much as with the 
non-euro countries in our sample, trade with all countries would also increase by 7-8   18
per cent. The individual effects for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom may be 
slightly different depending on their industry and trade patterns and other factors. 
The 7-8 per cent is probably an underestimate of the steady state effects of joining 
the currency union since the effects are increasing over time. The level of exports is 
about 20 per cent higher in 2002 than in 1989-1997 between euro countries, and about 
10 per cent higher for exports and imports with non-euro countries; see Table 2 and 
Figure 2. Based on these figures, by joining the currency union exports and imports 
with euro countries can be exptected to increase by 20 - 10 = 10 per cent, and exports 
and imports with non-euro countries also by 10 per cent. Thus, total trade can expected 
to increase by about 10 per cent with the countries in our sample (which in the case of 
Sweden make up 80 per cent of total trade). The increasing trend suggests that the long-
run effects are substantially greater. Micco et al (2003) and Bun and Klaassen (2003) 
estimate that the long run effect for trade in the eurozone is 35-40 per cent. 
Our predictions are for the currency union effects on trade. To this must be added 
the positive effects of eliminating nominal exchange rate volatility in trade within the 
eurozone. We estimated that a reduction of the average exchange rate volatility would 
result in an increase in trade of 1.5 per cent. Consequently, we should add about 0.75 
per cent – depending on the share of trade with other euro countries – to our predictions 
of the euro effect on trade.  
 
8. Summary and concluding comments 
We have employed the gravity model to estimate the effects on the volume of trade 
caused by the introduction of the euro in 1999. We use trade between the three euro 
outsiders in the EU, Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom, and between them and 
seven non-EU OECD countries as the benchmark. The seven are: Norway and 
Switzerland in Europe and Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States. 
(Trade between the seven non-EU countries are not included.)  By having exports as the 
dependent variable instead of bilateral exports as in the standard specification, we are 
able to separate euro effects on exports from euro to non-euro countries on the one 
hand, and exports from non-euro to euro countries on the other. Our data cover four 
years with the euro, 1999-2002.    19
We found that the introduction of the euro has increased trade between euro 
countries by 15 per cent on average for the period 1998-2002 compared to the 
benchmark for the period 1989-2002. Exports from euro to non-euro countries and from 
non-euro to euro countries increased by 8 and 7.5 per cent respectively. When the euro 
effects were estimated with year dummies we found the same pattern; exports between 
euro countries increased approximately twice as much as between euro and non-euro 
countries. The year effects show a very clear increasing trend starting in 1998, with 
significantly greater increases at the end of the euro period than at the beginning.  
The rising trend indicates that we have identified effects caused by the 
introduction of the euro. These should take hold gradually, as producers adjust 
production and supply patterns to the currency union.  
The relatively large increase estimated for trade between euro and non-euro 
countries could be explained by increasing vertical specialization along the lines 
suggested by Yi (2003). He provides an explanation for why small reductions in trade 
costs can cause large increases in trade and also for how they can make trade increase 
non-linearly. The single currency reduces the cost of vertical specialization inside the 
euro area and makes goods produced there more competitive. This leads to increased 
exports from euro to non-euro countries and at the same time to increased demand for 
inputs imported from non-euro countries. Producers outside the eurozone will be able to 
purchase cheaper inputs from the euro countries, which makes them more competitive 
and can increase their exports back to the euro countries. 
In addition to estimating euro effects on aggregate exports, we have estimated 
effects on one-digit SITC sector exports. The estimates show a wider distribution and 
less significance than the aggregate estimates, but the pattern is clear. Significant 
estimates are concentrated to goods that are relatively differentiated and processed. 
This supports the explanation of increased trade between euro and non-euro countries 
as caused by increased vertical specialization across countries. Significant effects can 
also be seen for beverages and tobacco, which are highly differentiated consumer 
goods. It requires a relatively large up-front investment in marketing and retail 
distribution to introduce such goods in a new national market (as is also true for many 
of the goods produced by manufacturing industries, such as cars.) The returns are   20
spread over many years into the future. We argue that the elimination of nominal 
exchange rate uncertainty between the euro countries has stimulated such investments 
and thereby has increased trade. 
Finally, we calculate the trade effects for Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom of joining the European currency union based on our estimates for aggregate 
trade. Their trade will increase both with the euro countries and with non-euro 
countries. We predict that the level of trade will be about 8 per cent higher on average 
during the first five years in the currency union and about 10 per cent higher in the fifth 
year. Most of the increase is caused by the common currency, but somewhat less than 
one percentage point is due to the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility in 
trade with countries in the currency union. 
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 Figure 1. Export performance, 1989-2002 
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Table 1. Determinants of log of exports from country i to country j   
  
Symbol                Description of variable 
  
EMU11  Dummy for exports between euro countries 
EMU12  Dummy for exports from euro to non-euro countries 
EMU21  Dummy for exports from non-euro to euro countries 
  
Ln(RYi)  Log of GDP of  exporting country 
Ln(RYj)  Log of GDP of importing country 
  
Ln(REXRij)  Log of real exchange rate between exporting and importing country 
Ln(REXRcj)  Log of average real exchange rate between third countries and importing 
country 
  
nomexr  Standard deviation of first differences of logs of montly nominal exchange 
rates between exporting and importing country 
  
eunew  Dummy for Austria, Finland and Sweden 1995-2002 
  
UR  Dummy for Uruguay Round liberalization 1995-2002 between countries not 
in same free trade area 
  
weu10t1993  Dummy for exports from non-European countries to  
EU-10 1993-2002 
wbnt1993  Dummy for exports from non-European countries to Belgium and 
Netherlands 1993-2002 
bneu12t1993  Dummy for exports from Belgium and Netherlands to EU countries 1993-
2002 
  
weu3t1995  Dummy for exports from non-European countries to Austria, Finland and 
Sweden 1995-2002 
wbnt1995  Dummy for exports from non-European countries to Belgium and 
Netherlands 1995-2002 
bneu3t1995  Dummy for exports from Belgium and Netherlands to Austria, Finland and 
Sweden 1995-2002 
  
eut  Year dummies common for EEA countries 
t 
 
fxd                        
Year dummies common for all countries 
 
Bilateral (fixed effects) dummy 
 
  
      
Table 2. Results with year EMU dummies 
 
ln(RYi)  1.228***  EUt1990  0.065*  emu11t1990 -0.042  emu12t1990 -0.047  emu21t1990 -0.032 
 (0.072)   (0.035)   (0.051)   (0.045)   (0.053) 
ln(RYj) 1.138***  EUt1991  0.085**  emu11t1991  -0.012 emu12t1991  -0.060 emu21t1991  0.034 
 (0.069)   (0.035)   (0.049)   (0.043)   (0.049) 
ln(REXRij) -1.058***  EUt1992  0.120***  emu11t1992  -0.015  emu12t1992  -0.042  emu21t1992  0.022 
 (0.052)   (0.034)   (0.047)   (0.041)   (0.048) 
ln(REXRcj) 0.726***  EUt1993  0.043  emu11t1993  -0.007  emu12t1993  -0.028  emu21t1993  0.044 
 (0.069)   (0.034)   (0.046)   (0.040)   (0.048) 
eunew 0.014 EUt1994  0.039 emu11t1994  0.062  emu12t1994 0.021  emu21t1994 0.082* 
 (0.013)   (0.033)   (0.045)   (0.039)   (0.046) 
UR 0.100***  EUt1995  0.128***  emu11t1995  0.046  emu12t1995 0.013  emu21t1995 0.021 
 (0.018)   (0.035)   (0.046)   (0.041)   (0.046) 
nomexr  -1.016**  EUt1996  0.206***  emu11t1996 -0.011  emu12t1996 -0.013  emu21t1996 -0.016 
 (0.456)   (0.036)   (0.046)   (0.041)   (0.048) 
wbnt1993 -0.268***  EUt1997  0.170***  emu11t1997 0.014  emu12t1997 0.005  emu21t1997 0.027 
 (0.050)   (0.034)   (0.045)   (0.039)   (0.046) 
weu10t1993 -0.244***  EUt1998  0.176***  emu11t1998 0.085*  emu12t1998 0.028 emu21t1998  0.062 
 (0.027)   (0.036)   (0.049)   (0.042)   (0.049) 
bneu12t1993 0.060***  EUt1999  0.174***  emu11t1999 0.108**  emu12t1999 0.054  emu21t1999 0.079* 
 (0.018)   (0.037)   (0.048)   (0.042)   (0.047) 
wbnt1995 0.166*** EUt2000  0.131*** emu11t2000  0.123**  emu12t2000 0.020  emu21t2000 0.100* 
 (0.043)   (0.039)   (0.054)   (0.046)   (0.054) 
weu3t1995 -0.457***  EUt2001  0.087**  emu11t2001 0.196***  emu12t2001 0.082*  emu21t2001 0.115**
 (0.038)   (0.040)   (0.054)   (0.046)   (0.054) 
bneu3t1995 0.228***  EUt2002  0.138***  emu11t2002  0.197***  emu12t2002 0.125**  emu21t2002 0.098* 
 (0.025)   (0.045)   (0.060)   (0.049)   (0.056) 
obs  4732          
panels  338          
R 2   0 . 9 9           
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year and bilateral (fixed effects) dummies included but not reported. 
  
 
Table 3. Significance of differences between years, year EMU dummy coefficients 
 
a) Exports between euro countries 
  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1990     0.41 0.36 0.64 5.96**  4.04**  0.51 1.73 7.65***  10.84***  10.39***  21.41***  17.14*** 
1991  0.41     0.01 0.02 3.67*  2.16 0  0.46 5.32**  8.41***  8.04***  18.76***  14.57*** 
1992  0.36 0.01     0.05 4.38**  2.56 0.02 0.66 6.36**  9.84***  9.23***  21.13***  15.96*** 
1993  0.64 0.02  0.05     3.77*  2.06 0.01 0.33 5.33**  8.55***  8.02***  19.39***  14.72*** 
1994  5.96** 3.67*  4.38**  3.77*     0.21 4.13**  2.04 0.35 1.43 1.83 8.72***  6.64*** 
1995  4.04**  2.16 2.56 2.06 0.21     2.38 0.86 1.01 2.6  2.91*  10.81***  8.25*** 
1996  0.51  0  0.02 0.01 4.13**  2.38     0.51  6.19**  9.81*** 9.12***  21.2*** 15.97*** 
1997  1.73  0.46 0.66 0.33 2.04 0.86 0.51     4.06**  7.39*** 7.03***  18.6*** 13.62*** 
1998  7.65***  5.32** 6.36** 5.33** 0.35  1.01  6.19** 4.06**     0.33 0.71 5.8**  4.45** 
1999  10.84***  8.41*** 9.84*** 8.55*** 1.43  2.6  9.81*** 7.39*** 0.33     0.12 3.8* 2.91* 
2000  10.39***  8.04*** 9.23*** 8.02*** 1.83  2.91*  9.12*** 7.03*** 0.71  0.12     2.09 1.69 
2001  21.41***  18.76*** 21.13*** 19.39***  8.72***  10.81*** 21.2***  18.6***  5.8**  3.8*  2.09     0 
2002  17.14***  14.57*** 15.96*** 14.72***  6.64***  8.25*** 15.97***  13.62*** 4.45**  2.91*  1.69  0    
F-test, chi2-values. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
 
b) Exports from euro to non-euro countries 
   1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1990     0.09 0.02 0.26 3.25*  2.32 0.74 1.91 3.31*  6.04**  2.26 8.11***  12.56*** 
1991  0.09     0.22 0.78 5.21**  3.84*  1.57 3.44*  5.14**  8.79***  3.56*  10.89***  15.85*** 
1992  0.02 0.22     0.18 3.64*  2.49 0.69 2.11 3.67*  7.02***  2.38 9.09***  13.98*** 
1993  0.26 0.78  0.18     2.39 1.49 0.19 1.1  2.48 5.39**  1.46 7.52***  12.24*** 
1994  3.25* 5.21**  3.64*  2.39     0.05 1.12 0.3  0.05 0.93 0  2.46 5.96** 
1995  2.32  3.84*  2.49 1.49 0.05     0.61 0.07 0.17 1.29 0.03 2.9* 6.43** 
1996  0.74  1.57 0.69 0.19 1.12 0.61     0.33 1.36 3.62*  0.71 5.66**  10.02*** 
1997  1.91  3.44*  2.11  1.1 0.3 0.07  0.33     0.52 2.33 0.18 4.29**  8.52*** 
1998  3.31*  5.14**  3.67*  2.48 0.05 0.17 1.36 0.52     0.48 0.04 1.7  4.66** 
1999  6.04**  8.79***  7.02***  5.39**  0.93 1.29 3.62*  2.33 0.48     0.7 0.49  2.62 
2000  2.26  3.56*  2.38 1.46 0  0.03 0.71 0.18 0.04 0.7     1.94 4.84** 
2001  8.11***  10.89***  9.09*** 7.52*** 2.46  2.9*  5.66**  4.29**  1.7  0.49  1.94     0.79 
2002  12.56***  15.85*** 13.98*** 12.24***  5.96**  6.43**  10.02***  8.52***  4.66** 2.62  4.84** 0.79    
F-test, chi2-values. 
















c) Exports from non-euro to euro countries 
   1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1990     2.02 1.38 2.76*  6.71***  1.47 0.12 1.84  4.14** 6.25** 6.34** 8.1*** 5.82** 
1991  2.02     0.09 0.05 1.44 0.11 1.48 0.04 0.43 1.26 1.84 2.85*  1.61 
1992  1.38 0.09     0.29 2.41 0  0.89 0.02 0.96 2.18 2.68 3.97**  2.39 
1993  2.76* 0.05  0.29     1.13 0.38 2.39 0.22 0.21 0.9  1.48 2.44 1.27 
1994  6.71*** 1.44 2.41 1.13     3.06*  7.1***  2.61 0.28 0.01 0.17 0.58 0.13 
1995  1.47  0.11 0  0.38 3.06*    1  0.03 1.16 2.67 3.11*  4.49**  2.69 
1996  0.12  1.48 0.89 2.39 7.1***  1     1.4  3.89** 6.52** 6.34** 8.22***  5.61** 
1997  1.84  0.04 0.02 0.22 2.61 0.03 1.4     0.91 2.34 2.84*  4.16**  2.42 
1998  4.14**  0.43 0.96 0.21 0.28 1.16 3.89**  0.91     0.21 0.67 1.33 0.56 
1999  6.25**  1.26 2.18 0.9  0.01 2.67 6.52**  2.34 0.21     0.22 0.67 0.17 
2000  6.34**  1.84 2.68 1.48 0.17 3.11*  6.34**  2.84*  0.67 0.22     0.09 0 
2001  8.1***  2.85*  3.97**  2.44 0.58 4.49**  8.22***  4.16**  1.33 0.67 0.09     0.1 
2002  5.82**  1.61 2.39 1.27 0.13 2.69 5.61**  2.42 0.56 0.17 0  0.1    
F-test, chi2-values. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
      
 
Table 4. Results with EMU period (1998-2002) dummies 
      (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
EMU11  0.244*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.139*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
EMU12  0.244*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.077*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
EMU21  0.018  0.056*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
        
ln(RYi)  0.711*** 1.165*** 1.162*** 1.164*** 1.186*** 1.222*** 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) 
ln(RYj)  1.336*** 1.182*** 1.179*** 1.181*** 1.178*** 1.146*** 
  (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) 
        
ln(REXRij)   -1.095*** -1.091*** -1.084*** -1.061*** -1.058*** 
    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) 
ln(REXRcj)    0.697*** 0.690*** 0.676*** 0.660*** 0.722*** 
    (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.067) 
        
nomexr     -0.825*  -0.760  -0.881*  -0.940** 
     (0.468)  (0.471)  (0.466)  (0.443) 
        
eunew       0.029**  0.037***  0.013 
       (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
        
UR      -0.002  0.036*  0.105*** 
       (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
        
weu10t1993         -0.174***  -0.252*** 
         (0.026)  (0.025) 
wbnt1993         -0.061  -0.246*** 
         (0.041)  (0.046) 
bneu12t1993         0.059***  0.063*** 
         (0.018)  (0.017) 
        
weu3t1995        -0.470*** 
        ( 0 . 0 3 8 )  
wbnt1995        0.135*** 
        ( 0 . 0 4 1 )  
bneu3t1995        0.235*** 
        ( 0 . 0 2 4 )  
obs  4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 
panels  338 338 338 338 338 338 
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year, EU membership and bilateral (fixed effects) dummies included but not reported. 
  
      
Table 5. Time sensitivity 
  1989 -  1990 -  1991 -  1992 -  1993 -  1994 -  1995 - 
EMU11  0.139*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.153*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.172*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
EMU12  0.077*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
EMU21  0.072*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.089*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
         
ln(RYi)  1.222*** 1.214*** 1.128*** 1.048*** 0.962*** 0.894*** 0.864*** 
  (0.071) (0.075) (0.079) (0.085) (0.093) (0.107) (0.125) 
ln(RYj)  1.146*** 1.174*** 1.141*** 1.093*** 1.012*** 1.019*** 1.077*** 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.080) (0.079) (0.088) (0.102) 
         
ln(REXRij) -1.058*** -1.057*** -0.999*** -0.924*** -0.848*** -0.835*** -0.811*** 
  (0.050) (0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
ln(REXRcj)  0.722*** 0.739*** 0.651*** 0.526*** 0.442*** 0.412*** 0.380*** 
  (0.067) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) 
         
nomexr -0.940**  -0.438 -0.415 -0.925*  -0.468  0.166  0.373 
  (0.443) (0.452) (0.477) (0.497) (0.559) (0.595) (0.633) 
         
eunew  0.013 0.017 0.024*  0.019 0.015 0.019   
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025)   
         
UR  0.105*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.124*** 0.107*** 0.087**   
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.036)   
         
weu10t1993 -0.252***  -0.237***  -0.243***  -0.211***       
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.053)       
wbnt1993 -0.246*** -0.253*** -0.271*** -0.231***       
  (0.046) (0.051) (0.060) (0.081)       
bneu12t1993  0.063*** 0.084*** 0.104*** 0.112***       
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027)       
         
weu3t1995  -0.470*** -0.463*** -0.466*** -0.448*** -0.411*** -0.440***   
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.051) (0.065) (0.088)   
wbnt1995 0.135*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.145*** 0.135**   
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.049) (0.064)   
bneu3t1995  0.235*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.228*** 0.219*** 0.236***   
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033) (0.039) (0.049)   
obs  4732 4394 4056 3718 3380 3042 2074 
panels  338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year, EU membership and bilateral (fixed effects) dummies included but not reported. 
 
  
      
Table 6. Country and country group sensitivity 
   e x c l u d i n g   …            
  All  Austria Belgium  Finland France Germany Ireland  Italy  Netherlands Portugal  Spain 
EMU11  0.139*** 0.152*** 0.130*** 0.139*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.126*** 0.134*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.139***
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) 
EMU12  0.077*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.080*** 0.115*** 0.080***
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
EMU21  0.072*** 0.095*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.086*** 0.075***
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
ln(RYi)  1.222*** 1.251*** 1.197*** 1.238*** 1.266*** 1.221*** 0.811*** 1.224*** 1.241*** 1.229*** 1.194***
  (0.071) (0.073) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.100) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) 
ln(RYj)  1.146*** 1.122*** 1.126*** 1.206*** 1.130*** 1.140*** 1.176*** 1.147*** 1.178*** 1.162*** 1.115***
  (0.069) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.092) (0.075) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) 
ln(REXRij)  -1.058*** -0.983*** -1.089*** -0.999*** -1.093*** -1.070*** -1.039*** -1.068*** -1.032*** -1.027*** -0.950***
  (0.050) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.052) (0.050) (0.053) 
ln(REXRcj)  0.722*** 0.633*** 0.751*** 0.694*** 0.734*** 0.743*** 0.683*** 0.733*** 0.682*** 0.712*** 0.529***
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068) (0.074) (0.071) (0.068) (0.072) 
nomexr  -0.940**  -0.615 -0.760 -0.897*  -0.967**  -0.928*  -1.519***  -0.871 -0.896*  -0.973**  -0.552 
  (0.443) (0.462) (0.476) (0.469) (0.476) (0.483) (0.470) (0.544) (0.474) (0.443) (0.461) 
eunew 0.013  0.019  0.009  0.021 -0.004  0.001 0.020 0.005 0.012 0.037***  0.043***
  (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
UR  0.105*** 0.084*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.111***
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
obs  4732 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 
panels  338 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
    
 
 
-  continued on next page – 
 
 
    
 
Table 6.  continued 
  excluding…           non-  non- 
 Denmark  Sweden  UK  Norway  Switz.  Australia  Canada  Japan  New  Zeal.  USA  Europe  EU15 
EMU11  0.149*** 0.105*** 0.137*** 0.157*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.153*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.123*** 0.114*** 0.088*** 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
EMU12  0.098*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.054*** 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.008 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) 
EMU21  0.076*** 0.058**  0.070*** 0.090*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.094*** 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) 
ln(RYi)  1.223*** 1.261*** 1.269*** 1.285*** 1.176*** 1.191*** 1.261*** 1.178*** 1.270*** 1.195*** 1.214*** 1.194*** 
  (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.070) (0.074) (0.072) (0.075) (0.072) (0.071) (0.083) (0.080) 
ln(RYj)  1.100*** 1.213*** 1.175*** 1.125*** 1.188*** 1.046*** 1.097*** 1.167*** 1.189*** 1.161*** 1.077*** 0.990*** 
  (0.071) (0.070) (0.073) (0.068) (0.074) (0.067) (0.070) (0.074) (0.068) (0.072) (0.074) (0.072) 
ln(REXRij)  -1.068*** -1.129*** -1.093*** -1.094*** -1.067*** -1.051*** -1.065*** -1.075*** -1.039*** -1.090*** -1.119*** -1.292*** 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.061) (0.047) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.066) (0.063) 
ln(REXRcj)  0.737*** 0.850*** 0.764*** 0.654*** 0.716*** 0.692*** 0.756*** 0.767*** 0.714*** 0.857*** 1.026*** 1.024*** 
  (0.072) (0.076) (0.082) (0.067) (0.072) (0.065) (0.070) (0.072) (0.069) (0.071) (0.080) (0.083) 
nomexr -0.999**  -0.941**  -1.169**  -0.666 -0.866*  -0.960** -1.015** -1.247***  -0.876** -0.939** -1.257***  -1.460*** 
  (0.474) (0.475) (0.493) (0.453) (0.479) (0.433) (0.447) (0.468) (0.438) (0.466) (0.448) (0.448) 
eunew  0.009 0.015 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.008 0.001  -0.002 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
UR  0.100*** 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.043**  0.160*** 0.101*** 0.132*** 0.093*** 0.109*** 0.088***     
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)     
obs  4200 4200 4200 4368 4368 4368 4368 4368 4368 4368 2912 2184 
panels  300 300 300 312 312 312 312 312 312 312 208 156 
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 




      
Table 7. Specification sensitivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EMU11  0.139*** 0.294*** 0.224*** 0.144*** 0.131*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.150*** 0.104***
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
EMU12  0.077*** 0.160*** 0.188*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.098*** 0.115*** 0.081*** 0.020 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) 
EMU21  0.072*** 0.150*** 0.044**  0.072*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.014 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) 
           
ln(RYi) 1.222***    0.791*** 1.225*** 1.237*** 1.188*** 1.186***  1.227***  0.914***
  (0.071)    (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.062) 
ln(RYj) 1.146***    1.268*** 1.149*** 1.174*** 1.160*** 1.178***  1.150***  0.839***
  (0.069)    (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.059) 
           
ln(REXRij) -1.058***  -0.662***    -1.061*** -1.083*** -1.103*** -1.061*** -1.041*** -0.972***
  (0.050) (0.052)    (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) 
ln(REXRcj) 0.722***  -0.041    0.728*** 0.759*** 0.752*** 0.660***  0.683***  0.553***
  (0.067) (0.072)    (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.064) (0.067) 
           
nomexr -0.940**  -1.626***  -1.208**    -1.196*** -0.745 -0.881*  -0.881**  -1.383***
  (0.443) (0.502) (0.496)    (0.446) (0.455) (0.466) (0.420) (0.407) 
           
eunew 0.013  -0.000  0.034**  0.016   0.004  0.037***  0.053***  0.007 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)    (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
UR  0.105*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 0.107***   0.038**  0.036*  0.045*** 0.059***
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)    (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) 
           
weu10t1993  -0.252*** -0.240*** -0.302*** -0.251*** -0.212***  -0.174***  -0.246***  -0.247***
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)    (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
wbnt1993  -0.246*** -0.257*** -0.300*** -0.244*** -0.236***  -0.061  -0.237***  -0.244***
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046)    (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) 
bneu12t1993 0.063*** 0.032  -0.002  0.063*** 0.060***   0.059*** 0.088*** 0.057***
  (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)    (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
           
weu3t1995  -0.470*** -0.477*** -0.505*** -0.470*** -0.426*** -0.391***  -0.467***  -0.477***
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)    (0.038) (0.039) 
wbnt1995  0.135*** 0.114*** 0.160*** 0.133*** 0.175*** 0.053    0.130*** 0.139***
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)    (0.041) (0.042) 
bneu3t1995  0.235*** 0.199*** 0.160*** 0.234*** 0.242*** 0.233***   0.234*** 0.229***
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)    (0.024) (0.025) 
           
EU  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no  yes 
dummies                           
           
Year  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
dummies                           
obs  4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 4732 
panels  338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
R2  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Bilateral (fixed effects) dummies included but not reported. 
  
      
Table 8.  Results for sectors (one-digit SITC rev. 3), 1995-2002 




















































EMU11  0.172*** 0.014  0.352*** -0.033  -0.196  0.044  0.069*  0.124*** 0.224*** 0.071*** 
  (0.021) (0.041) (0.086) (0.054) (0.198) (0.152) (0.038) (0.034) (0.037) (0.027) 
EMU12  0.089***  0.047 0.129*  -0.063  -0.096  0.186 0.078**  0.002 0.087**  -0.002 
  (0.018) (0.037) (0.072) (0.052) (0.172) (0.125) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.023) 
EMU21 0.089***  -0.088**  0.161*  -0.115*** 0.075 0.139 0.059 0.088**  0.120***  0.009 
  (0.019) (0.039) (0.087) (0.044) (0.167) (0.133) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) 
            
ln(RYi) 0.864*** -0.990***  -0.639** 0.928*** -0.652  1.926**  1.955*** -0.661***  1.142*** 0.160 
  (0.125) (0.243) (0.303) (0.328) (0.910) (0.907) (0.205) (0.167) (0.131) (0.159) 
ln(RYj) 1.077*** 0.868*** 1.370*** 0.574**  0.580 0.645 1.105***  0.735***  1.044***  0.608*** 
  (0.102) (0.225) (0.442) (0.248) (0.722) (0.547) (0.164) (0.126) (0.160) (0.144) 
            
ln(REXRij)  -0.811*** -1.610*** -1.695*** -1.268*** -2.459*** -1.934*** -1.180*** -1.262*** -0.805*** -1.302*** 
  (0.056) (0.115) (0.224) (0.131) (0.371) (0.332) (0.095) (0.091) (0.105) (0.072) 
ln(REXRcj)  0.380*** 1.341*** 1.373*** 0.821*** 1.608*** 1.979*** 0.886*** 0.912*** 0.178  0.887*** 
  (0.076) (0.167) (0.322) (0.206) (0.560) (0.504) (0.143) (0.125) (0.154) (0.110) 
            
nomexr  0.373  4.622***  6.232**  -2.371 -2.005 0.804  -2.754**  2.279**  0.026  4.655*** 
  (0.633) (1.327) (2.763) (1.615) (4.926) (3.977) (1.198) (1.059) (1.112) (0.867) 
obs 2704 2702 2659 2702 2539 2460 2703 2704 2704 2704 
R2  0.994 0.985 0.961 0.975 0.914 0.917 0.987 0.991 0.988 0.993 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Year, EU membership, “Rotterdam effect” and bilateral (fixed effects) dummies included but not reported. 
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